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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ATTORNEY GENERAL
ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Appellant,

-vMORONI L. JENSEN,
President, Utah State
Senate; UTAH BOARD OF
REGENTS and UTAH
STATE UNIVERSITY,

CASE NO.

Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ROBERT B. HANSEN

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by appellant from an Order of the Third
Judicial District Court, denying appellant's Motion for Swrmary
Judgment and granting respondents' Motions for Swrmary Judgment,
thereby holding Senate Bill No. 201 (Chapter 114, Laws of Utah 1977),
constitutional and valid.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order of the Third Judicial
District Court which would then render Senate Bill 201 (Chapter 114.
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Laws of Utah 1977), in violation of Article VI, Section 22 of the
Utah Constitution and the Utah Senate's "Consent Calendar" procedure
unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this matter are not in dispute.

Appellant

and respondents have entered into a stipulated statement of facts
which is contained in the record on appeal. Appellant does not intend
to rely upon the Transcript of Proceedings before the Third Judicial
District Court, pursuant to Rule 75 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro·
cedure. The notice requirements and other procedural matters are not
in question in this appeal.
The issues presented center around the utilization of a "Consent Calendar" procedure adopted by the Utah State Senate on February
21, 1977. Copies of the written Consent Calendar procedure appear as
Exhibit (A) and Exhibit (B) to the stipulated statement of facts. A
copy is also attached as Exhibit (A) to appellant's (plaintiff's)

Cornplai~tl

The Consent Calendar procedure utilized by the Utah Senate pro·
vides that a bill or resolution may be considered for passage upon a fin~·
ing that:
(1) A quorum is present,
(2) Those favoring passage when called for by the
President of the Senate respond collectively
with a "yea" vote; and
(3) When called for if a single "nay" vote is voiced at
that time, then a full roll call vote is taken.
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All senators present are presumed to have voted and voted affirmatively.

It is recorded in the Senate Journal as all present having

voted and voted "yea." Those senators not present are listed as absent.
No provision is made for an abstention vote.

Bills on the Consent

Calendar may not be debated or amended on the floor but may only be referred back to a standing committee on a majority vote.
Appellant takes no issue with the Consent Calendar procedure,
except on final passage.

Whether the Consent Calendar requires a three-

day waiting period, or applies to a first and second reading, or committee assignments, is irrelevant to this appeal.
Senate Bill 201 (Chapter 114, Laws of Utah 1977), was adopted
on final passage by the Consent Calendar procedure utilized by the Utah
Senate. The 1977 Senate Journal for day No. 46, at page 592, lists only
the fo 11 owing :
"S.B. No. 201 UTAH STATE FIELDHOUSE BONDS was read
the third time and placed on its final passage.
S.B. No. 201 was approved by unanimous voice vote
of all Senators present. (Senator Peterson absent)
S.B. No. 201 was transmitted to the House."
The senators present are not separately listed as voting in favor of
S.B. 201.

Nothing else is listed in the Senate Journal regarding the final

passage of S.B. 201.
Senate Bill 201 authorizes, among other things, the issuance

-3-
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of revenue bonds for the remodeling of the existing fieldhouse at
Utah State University. All parties to this action have requested
advance placement on the calendar of the Third Judicial District
Court, and this Court as remodeling of the fieldhouse has already
conmenced. A final and expeditious resolution of the issues presented herein will enable bond counsel and administrators to make
appropriate decisions regarding continued construction, once the
constitutional questions have been answered. The Utah Senate passed
127 other bills and resolutions in the 1977 General Session, utilizing
its Consent Calendar procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION,
REQUIRES A "YEA" AND "NAY" VOTE UPON FINAL PASSAGE
OF ALL BILLS, AND, THEREFORE, THE "CONSENT PROCEDURE"
FOLLOWED BY THE UTAH SENATE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, requires,
among other things, that:
. . • The vote upon the fi na 1 passage of a11 bi 11 s
shall-be by yeas and nays and entered upon the respective
journals of the house in which the vote occurs. 11
11

The Senate Journal shows that Senate Bill No. 201 was approved finally byl
unanimous voice vote of all senators present and with one senator absent.

It does not separately list the individual senators voting "yea."
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It only presumes everyone voted yea when collectively the body of
senators responded yea.

It is conceivable that some senators either

through inattention or indifference did not vote at all, even though
present at the time.

No provision is made for abstention votes.

In

holding that a constitutional provision requiring "assent" for passage required an affirmative act, the Missouri Supreme Court in 1878 stated that
one staying away from the polls on voting day does not express an agreement of his mind to a proper vote upon or simply manifest thereby an
indifference on the subject. Words and Phrases, 1 Yea'Vol. 46 (1970). at
page 519, citing The State ex rel Woodson v. Brassfield, 67 Mo. 331, 335
(1878).

Taking a yea and nay vote contemplates a roll call vote whereupon each individual responds, and his vote is recorded separately with
his name in the Journal.

Black's Law Dictionary, (Revised 4th Ed. P. 1791),

defines the phrase "the yeas and nays" as "calling for the individual
and oral vote of each member, usually upon a call of the roll." (Emphasis
supplied.) Robert's Rules of Order, Section 44, contains the following
entry on p. 353:
"ROLL CALL VOTE. Taking a vote by roll call (or by
yeas and nays, as it is also called} •.•• " (Their
emphasis.)
Robert's RulES of Order further discusses other voting procedures which are
clearly separate and distinct from a yea-nay; i.e., roll call, vote;
for examp 1e,

illustrates how standing votes, voice votes, etc ••

are taken and these differ markedly in fonn from roll call votes.
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The cases on the issue are in accord with the above authorities.

Lincoln v. Haugen, 48 N.W. 196 (Minn. 1891), sustained the

validity of Chapter 129. Gen. Laws 1885, Minnesota.against an attack
based on the theory that the Legislature had not complied with a. constitutional provision mandating yea-nay votes.

Since the constitutional

provision did not govern the bill before the Court. the Court's pronounce.
ment is dicta.

Nevertheless, the Court at p. 196, in discussing alterna-

tive voting procedures, stated that a yea-nay vote is synonymous with a

1

j

'

ro 11 ca 11 vote.
"Apart from such constitutional prov1s1ons, the
ordinary method of taking a vote upon a question
is by the voices, show of hands, or by a rising
vote, affirmative or negative. It may also be
done by a roll-call. But where the object is to ascertain the names as well as the number voting on
each side, with a view to have them entered on the
journal, this method, when resorted to, to obtain such
lists of names, is denominated, 'taking the yeas and
nays on a question.'"
In To Certain Members of the House of Representatives in the
General Assembly, 191 A. 269 (R. I. 1937), the Rhode Island Supreme Court
declined to render an advisory opinion as certain procedural requirements
necessary to authorize it to render an opinion were not satisfied. It

I

appears that these requirements were not met because the presiding officer in the House would not permit roll call votes to be taken. In ex·
plaining its refusal to opine, the Court, at p. 27, had occasion to ex·
plain its understanding of what a yea-nay vote required:
" ••• In this connection it is pertinent to point
out the provisions of section 8 of article 4 of our
Constitution, which provides: 'Each house shall keep
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J

a journal of its proceedings. The yeas and nays of the
members of either house shall, at the desire of onefifth of those present, be entered on the journal.'
This mandatory provision of the Constitution requires a
roll call, and a recording of the vote of the members of
the House, when proper and timely request is made therefor.
It is right that neither the House nor any member thereof,
whatever position he may occupy in its organization, may disregard or willfully nullify.It
In People v. Chicago & E.I.

Ry.

Co., 145 N.E. 716 (Ill. 1924),

the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a county tax not levied upon an
aye and nay vote.

The evidence showerl that the

" •.. resolutions in the matter of the levy of tax
were adopted by a viva voce vote; that there was no
roll call; that those who were in favor of adopting
the resolutions voted by simply saying 'aye,' and
those opposed voted collectively by saying 'no. 111
On the issue of whether this procedure complied with the requirement for
an aye-nay vote, the Court held that this
(The procedure)
does not show an aye and nay vote, or a roll
call, which is necessary to such a vote •••• It shows
the taking of a viva voce vote, and that the resolution was carried by such vote. It does not show any compliance or attempt at compliance with the requirement
of the statute that there shall be an aye and nay vote
and the entry of such vote on the record." (p. 717)
11

•••

The procedure followed in People v. Chicago &E.I. Ry. Co. supra,
is basically identical with the procedure utilized in adopting Senate Bill
201.

In light of the preceding authorities, it seems fairly certain that,

if the Utah courts were to follow the existing doctrine, they would be
compelled to hold the Legislature did not take the roll call vote required by Article VI, Section 22, even though the journals would show the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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result of the voice vote.
It is also well settled that provisions in state Constitutions requiring final votes to be upon yeas and nays are mandatory,
not permissive. Article I, Section 26, Utah Constitution.

People

v. Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., supra; State ex rel. General Motors Coi:.E_.,
A.C. Electronics Division v. City of Oak Creek, 182 N.W. 2d 481, 492
(Wisc. 1971).

Therefore, the Legislature's failure to comply with

the mandate of Article VI, Section 22, should result in a declaration
that the law was not validly enacted.

Such was the result in State

ex rel. General Motors Corp., A.C. Electronics Division v. City of Oak
Creek, supra.

There the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld an attack ona

statute imposing a personal property tax on U.S. Government property in
General Motors' possession.

Despite Article VIII, Section 8 of the Wis· I
'

consin Constitution, which requires a vote by yeas and nays where the Le!·
is 1ature imposes a tax, the Legislature did not take the necessary vote.
The Court, at page 492, rejected an attack on the rule therein set fortn
and held that
"
where a
that the yeas and
lative journals.
to render Section

tax is enacted it is mandatory
nays be recorded in the legisThis defect alone is sufficient
70. ll (BM}, Stats., a nullity."

Courts will often strain to uphold legislation that does not
strictly comply with constitutional requirements.

While it is submittea

I

that the case law treating the yea-nay vote as mandatory disposes of thi!
possibility, a court might be.susceptible to a substantial compliance

I
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argument; i.e., one that claimed since the purpose behind the
constitutional requirement had been met, the law should be declared validly enacted. An example of such a case is Day v. Walker,
247 N.W. 350 (Neb. 1933).

The Nebraska Constitution requires final

votes to be taken viva voce. The Legislature had installed an
electronic voting system whereby the vote of each individual member appeared next to his name on a tally board mounted in the legislative chamber.

The Court sustained the laws enacted while this device

was in use because it interpreted the viva voce provision as requiring
only that the votes of each and every legislator be public; that is,
be open to all to know and see.

In effect, the Court went bEU'ond the

language of the Constitution and sought to insure only that the procedure
met the spirit, if not the language, of the Constitution.
Two possible rationales for the yea-nay requirement of Article VI, Section 22, are suggested.

First, the vote could be required

for the purpose of creating a public record which details how each member of the body voted.

The rationale would be that democratic govern-

ment works best only when the people know where their representatives
stand on given matters.

See People v. Chicago &N.W. Ry. Co., 71 N.E.

2d 701 (Ill. 1947); Day v. Walker, supra. This is the issue of accountability.

There is no accountability when Utah senators may quietly ab-

stain from voting, and when the specific vote is not listed next to their
names in the Journal.
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The second rationale, however, is more troublesome to those
contending for the validity of Senate Bill 201.

Cooley, Constitu-

tional Limitations (5th Ed.), at page 169, declares that the yea-nay
vote requirement
"
is designed to serve an important purpose in
compelling each member present to assume as well as
feel his due share of responsibility in legislation... "
If one considers the yea-nay vote provision as basically a device to
protect against ill-conceived laws by forcing each legislator to take
a position on the bill, thereby increasing the likelihood that he will
study and think about the law, then the procedure utilized to adopt
Senate Bill 201 does not satisfy the purpose for the provision. Likewise, according to the Consent Calendar procedure, the bill may not be
debated or amended immediately prior to the vote for final passage.
Accordingly, the substantial compliance argument is not a viable argument.
Respondents would urge this Court to follow the enrolled bill
doctrine apparently first espoused by the Utah Supreme Court in 1896 in
the case of Richie v. Richards, 14 Utah 345, at page 354, whic;h provides:
"The statutes in question having been duly
signed, approved and deposited in the office of the
secretary of state, we must conclusively presume that
all constitutional requisites were complied with in
their enactment .•.. "
It should be noted, however, that two of the three members of
the Utah Supreme Court at that time, Justice Bartch and Justice Miner,
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concurred in the ultimate holding, denying petitioner's request
for a Writ of Prohibition, but, however, dissented from Chief
Justice Zane's opinion and concluded at pages (co1TUTiencing at page
361 and page 369, respectively}, that the validity of a statute
when duly enrolled, signed, approved and deposited with the secretary of state is prima facie, but not conclusive evidence of its constitutional enactment and of what the law is.

Further, when that

statute is drawn in question, the Courts who are called upon to determine its validity may have power to go beyond the enrolled act and
look into the Journals of the Legislature required to be kept by the
Constitution to satisfy the judicial mind as to its constitutional
passage.

(At page 362)

It should also be noted in Richie v. Richards,

supra, that the Utah Supreme Court specifically held that the limitations and restrictions contained in Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution, in question herein respecting the enactment of laws, are
mandatory and binding upon the Legislature.
Respondents also submit the case of Dean v. Rampton, 538 P.2d
169 (1975).

This case basically stands for the proposition that the Court

may look to the Journals to uphold the constitutionality of any act. Appellants take no issue with this case, but note only that the Senate
Journals do not list the respective yea votes of each senator pertaining
to Senate Bill 201, but only list that one senator was absent.

It is

submitted that this does not meet the mandatory requirements of the Utah
Constitution set forth in Article VI, Section 22, on its face.
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CONCLUSION
Constitutional provisions calling for a yea-nay vote are
satisfied only where a roll call vote is taken.

Such provisions are

mandatory and even if a court were disposed to find such a provision
satisfied on the basis of substantial compliance, the possible dual
rationales for the provision are such as to dictate against any finding of substantial compliance here.

Accordingly, Senate Bi 11 201 would

not appear to have been adopted in accordance with the provision of
Article VI, Section 22 of the Ut~Constitution which mandates that
upon the final passage of all bil s the vote is to be by yeas and

nays.

R••tt~·b.A#LbV;,

M~(EL

L. DEAMER

Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Robert B. Hansen,
Appellant

Dated September 23, 1977.
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